In June of 1994, then President William Clinton sat in the oval office with his closest advisers, agonizingly contemplating preventive strikes against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear facilities. 1 The DPRK had crossed a clear cut "red line" set by the administration when they began defueling the frozen nuclear reactor located near Yongbyon, North Korea. 2 Earlier in 1993, through a process of United Nations International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) reviews of notable discrepancies in North Korean spent nuclear fuel reporting and U.S. satellite photography, the United States and the IAEA surmised
Pyongyang had embarked on a nuclear weapons quest. Evidence indicated the North Korean regime had somehow built, managed, and hid an entire nuclear fuel cycle all on its own. 3 Given
Pyongyang's track record for ballistic missile development and proliferation to such countries as Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Pakistan, Libya, and Syria, it was not much of a leap to assume nuclear technology proliferation, and a dramatic shift in the balance of power on the peninsula would be the next steps for North Korea. 4 As President Clinton and his advisers struggled to make a strategy decision, they were interrupted by a phone call from former President Jimmy Carter.
Carter, in consultation with the Clinton administration, had flown to Pyongyang not as an official diplomat of the United States, but as a private citizen to meet personally with North Korean president Kim Il Sung. 5 Carter advised President Clinton of a potential breakthrough to stop the escalating nuclear crisis. Over the next five months the ensuing negotiations survived the July 1994 death of "The Great Leader" Kim Il Sung, and narrowly averted preventive U.S. military action. States and its regional partners into negotiations to subdue North Korean nuclear ambitions.
While current negotiations have all parties hopeful of a settlement, 7 much has changed since the last round of talks more than a decade ago. Preemption, once a tacit policy, had now taken center stage as the star concept of a new national security strategy aimed at a new threat.
This project focuses on the current U.S. strategic concept of preemption as outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) , and the implications of such a strategy in dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The study will provide a brief history of North Korea's nuclear program, including efforts to gain nuclear weapons, the ensuing negotiations between the DPRK, the United States, and its regional partners, and describe where the issue stands at present. Because the concept of preemption opens a veritable "Pandora's box" of legal, moral, and international implications, the paper will explore current international law and its views on preemption. The paper will continue with an explanation of red lines, and the advantages and pitfalls of setting them. It will suggest possible red lines the current administration might set that respect international law, can rally support from international partners, and send clear, unequivocal signals to Pyongyang. Finally, the project concludes with proposed changes to the NSS, the rationale for the changes, and suggested conditions which must be met to implement any changes.
Historical Background, 1980 Background, -1994 North Korean nuclear ambitions date back to the early 1950s when Soviet advisers began training DPRK scientists in nuclear technology. By 1965 with the help of the Soviet Union, the North had procured an extremely small, 2-MW(th) reactor which was subsequently upgraded to 4-MW(th). 8 Over the next two decades, North Korea began efforts to mine uranium and graphite, and began experimenting with plutonium separation, a crucial step towards a nuclear weapons capability. Ultimately, a 5-MW(e) graphite-moderated, uranium fueled reactor was built at Yongbyon, North Korea. This reactor, similar to British designs of the time, was capable of producing plutonium suitable for weapons. 9 Construction also began on a much larger 50-MW(e) gas-graphite reactor, and a host of facilities capable of separating plutonium from spent fuel rods. A small, highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor was built at a nearby university, and construction commenced on a 200-MW(e) gas-graphite reactor at Taechon. 10 Of the four reactors, only the Yongbyon reactor and the HEU research reactor ever reached working capacity. The IAEA estimates the 5-MW Yongbyon reactor yields enough plutonium to produce roughly one nuclear weapon per year.
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In 1985, after much pressure from the Soviet Union and promises to help provide four light water nuclear reactors (LWR), the DPRK signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT); however, due to a variety of reasons, public and private, Pyongyang refused to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement allowing the UN inspectors access to nuclear sites. 12 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the deal fell apart in late 1991 when the DPRK was unable to come up with funding for the reactors. At the same time, South Korean president Roh Tae Woo, along with U.S. president George H. W. Bush, jointly agreed to remove all nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. Subsequently, president Roh began a concerted effort at engagement with the North. A series of meetings on denuclearization ensued, culminating in the bilateral North-South Denuclearization Declaration (referred to as the Joint Declaration or NSDD). The key tenants of the agreement prohibited both sides from producing or procuring nuclear weapons, and prohibited separating plutonium, enriching uranium, or possessing the facilities for doing so. Additionally both sides agreed to allow reciprocal inspections to verify compliance with the agreement; however, neither side has been able to agree on the place, time, and scope of the inspections and to date, none have taken place (North Korea officially renounced the agreement in May 2003).
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In 1992, North Korea finally yielded to the IAEA safeguards agreement and supplied the agency with the required reports of its nuclear holdings and facilities as required. The IAEA was finally allowed to inspect the facilities at Yongbyon after a seven-year delay in which the North Korean facilities went unchecked. Based on discrepancies in the reports, IAEA atmospheric sampling around the facilities, and U.S. satellite imagery, the IAEA concluded the DPRK had separated more plutonium than it had disclosed. North Korean refusal to permit additional inspections of two sites believed to house the missing materials resulted in heightened tensions, UN proposals for sanctions, and North Korean threats to withdraw from the NPT.
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In the summer of 1993, multilateral talks between the U.S., Japan, South, and North
Korea aimed at finding a solution to the crisis produced an agreement that somewhat calmed the situation. While the agreement kept the DPRK in the NPT, continued disagreement with IAEA inspectors and failure of the Joint Declaration caused tensions to once more rise. Over the next year the DPRK discontinued operations at the Yongbyon reactor, and in the Spring of 1994, removed spent fuel rods without IAEA oversight, crossing a critical red line set by the Clinton administration. 15 Lack of oversight made it impossible for the IAEA to accurately verify the amount of plutonium removed and sequestered. At an impasse, the Clinton administration sought UN sanctions and began considering preemptive strikes against the North Korean nuclear facilities. 16 As a last hope and with the reluctant approval of the administration, former president Jimmy Carter flew to North Korea as a private citizen to engage Kim Il Sung on a solution. 17 The two proposed an agreement along the lines of the August 1993 talks.
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Negotiations were seriously threatened with the death of Kim Il Sung that July, but ultimately the Agreed Framework, a bilateral U.S.-DPRK arrangement, was signed in October 1994. The
Framework brought a much needed, though temporary, end to tensions.
The Framework called for the provision of two light-water nuclear reactors funded by Japan, South Korea, and the European Union at a cost of $4.6B, and much needed energy incentives in the form of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year supplied by the U.S. at no cost to North Korea until the first new reactor came on line. Additionally, the deal furnished incentives to bolster the DPRK's floundering economy and provided the security guarantees North Korea had long sought. In return, North Korea agreed to follow all NPT safeguards and allow IAEA inspectors access to the Yongbyon nuclear facilities to verify compliance. The DPRK also agreed to freeze plutonium production, cease nuclear weapons development, and dismantle all current nuclear facilities on a schedule commensurate with the building of the new LWRs. Even more, the North acquiesced to recommit to the Joint Declaration and promised to strengthen ties and work closer on regional issues. 19 Historical Background, 1994-Present Praised for its tactical success and loathed for its strategic failure, the accord halted North Korea's weapons grade plutonium production, but did nothing to thwart highly enriched uranium endeavors or ballistic missile proliferation. 20 Termed by some as the "best of only bad options at the time," 21 noted Korean expert Jasper Becker called the Framework "the most peculiar international agreement ever devised." 22 Becker was perplexed that the United States would essentially reward the DPRK for their breaches of international nuclear security measures by offering them more nuclear reactors! In less than a decade the Framework eroded into a new crisis.
In reality, both sides contributed to the demise of the agreement. U.S. hardliners in Congress labeled the agreement "appeasement." 23 Funding for the promised fuel oil, subject each year to congressional approval, was often slow-rolled and/or reduced to the point where delivery was late or incomplete. 24 The U.S. also underestimated costs and overestimated partner contributions, delaying promised construction of the two reactors. To date, neither has been completed. 25 At the same time, the United States became focused on events in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti. In its relief at preventing a nuclear confrontation the likes of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 26 America essentially ignored the Korean Peninsula for a full eight years. Not surprisingly, North Korea presupposed the U.S. had reneged on its assurances, and was simply buying time for what it believed would soon be a North Korean regime collapse. 27 Under the impression it had received the short end of the agreement, and believing pledges were not being respected, the DPRK seized the moment to resume weapons development unchecked. 28 By early 2003, the United States ascertained the North had secretly developed highly enriched uranium and confronted the regime with that fact. Though not "technically" in violation of the Framework (since the prohibition was on "plutonium" separation), the U.S. viewed the production as a breach of the "spirit and intent" of the agreement. 29 In addition, it was a blatant violation of the Joint Declaration between the two Koreas-an agreement the North had promised to implement.
Predictably, as a result of U.S. accusations, the North pushed back. • For the first time, the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards • The U.S. confirmed it had no nuclear weapons on the peninsula, no desire to place them there, and publicly guaranteed North Korea it had no intention of attacking with either nuclear or conventional weapons-the security guarantee North Korea has long sought • In accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the ROK will not receive or allow nuclear weapons on its soil; it verified no weapons currently exist • The U.S. and its partners agreed to attempt to normalize relations and provide the DPRK assistance for both economic and energy needs • The DPRK stated its right (in accordance with the NPT) to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect of that right, and agreed to discuss.
at an appropriate time, the subject of providing LWRs While seemingly a momentous breakthrough, the elation was short-lived. The North began a series of vehement verbal attacks on the statement and the U.S. the very next day. At the center of the attacks was the provision of LWRs, a promise twice before made to the North, but in the eyes of the DPRK, had been reneged on both times. 35 All elements of the DPRK's past and present nuclear programs -plutonium and uranium -and all nuclear weapons will be comprehensively declared and completely, verifiably, and irreversibly eliminated, and will not be reconstituted in the future. According to these principles, the DPRK will return, at an early date, to the NPT and come into full compliance with IAEA safeguards, including by taking all steps that may be deemed necessary to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's declarations of nuclear materials and activities.
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Mr. Hill clarified the term "at an appropriate time" by further putting forth that all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs must be dismantled and verified to the satisfaction of all parties by credible international means, including the IAEA. He announced that once the DPRK had come into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, had demonstrated a sustained commitment to cooperation and transparency, and had ceased proliferation efforts, the United States would address the nuclear reactor issue. 40 As noted Korean expert David Kang points out, this is typical of the stalemated relationship between the two countries. In the past, the North wanted security guarantees before dismantling weapons; the U.S. wanted the weapons dismantled before giving guarantees. Now, the North wants a LWR built before dismantling weapons; the U.S. wants the weapons dismantled before building the reactor. 41 The more things change, the more they seem to stay the same.
While cautious optimism may be warranted, North Korea's past negotiating performance, the collapse of the 1994 agreement, and current indicators that while promising, still show signs of continued deceptive tactics, make it more than prudent for the United States to prepare other options in the event diplomacy fails. Should preemption be one such option?
Preemption, Prevention, and International Law 42
Preemption is defined by Anthony Clark Arend as "the use of military force in advance of a first use of force by the enemy (emphasis added)." 43 Preemption is differentiated from prevention in that preventive measures look to future developments that left unchecked would pose a significant threat to national interests and security. Both preemptive and preventive actions can be wide in scope and target military forces and weapons, the opposing regime, or enabling sources of national power such as information or economic capabilities. 44 Prevention is "cold blooded", designed to deal with problems before a crisis emerges; preemption is a desperate strategy employed in the heat of crisis. 45 Since prevention deals with eliminating an adversary's capability prior to reaching maturity, the U.S. essentially missed the opportunity to International law is consensually agreed upon by states and derives its origins through one of two ways, treaties or custom. 49 Treaties, essentially international contracts, are signed, legally binding documents between two or more states. Since 1945, the most recognized and universally accepted treaty basis for modern international law is the United Nations Charter to which 191 nations are signatories. 50 Customary law derives its origin from norms drawn from state practices established over time. Not set down in writing, but adhered to in practice, the custom ultimately becomes an "authoritative state practice." 51 Diplomatic immunity is perhaps the most well known international law whose roots lie in customary beginnings.
When reviewing the legality of preemption, we must look at both treaty law and customary practice. As stated above, since 1945 the predominant written source for law as it pertains to the preemptive use of force is the United Nations Charter. The charter contains two commonly cited passages, Article 2(4) in Chapter 1, and Article 51 in Chapter 7. Article 2 (4) states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
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The purpose of Article 2(4) is to prohibit states from solving disputes through the use of force and instead, directs that problems be referred to the United Nations to be resolved through Several key concepts are apparent in the language of the charter. First, the right to self-defense is "inherent" meaning it predates the treaty, and is a customarily recognized precedent.
Second, self-defense is permitted in response to "an armed attack." Taken literally, this would suggest the respondent must receive the first blow before taking protective action; however, logic would dictate that no state should be required to stand and absorb an impending strike without taking the necessary steps at protection. If those steps are preemptive to an attack, they become tantamount to "anticipatory self-defense" and must meet several criteria if the action is to be considered "legal." 54 To understand those criteria, we must turn back to look at customary law. The legal and internationally accepted precedent for "anticipatory self-defense" stems from the Caroline case. 55 In 1837, British soldiers entered U.S. territory from Canada and boarded an American ship called the Caroline. The British, believing the crew was aiding Canadian forces opposed to British rule, set fire to the ship and loosed it over Niagara Falls. In the process, several
American sailors were killed, prompting a myriad of U.S. diplomatic protests. For their part the British claimed they had acted preemptively in self-defense. In 1841, in response to the British assertions, then Secretary of State Daniel Webster drafted a diplomatic note to Lord Ashburton.
Webster put forth that for the British to claim self-defense, they must be able to show that the "…necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation..." 56 In other words, the British would need to show the threat posed by the Caroline was imminent, posed the gravest of dangers, and could not have been overcome by other, non-forceful means. In effect, a claimant of self-defense must be able to
show the "necessity" of the act. 57 Webster's letter goes further to propose that even if selfdefense is warranted, the action must also be "proportionate" to the threat. Unable to meet the logical points laid out by Secretary Webster, the British eventually apologized for the incident.
The two criteria, necessity and proportionality, are considered the standards for what constitutes an imminent threat necessitating anticipatory self-defense. 58 If the international community recognizes situations where preemptive action is acceptable, why has the Bush-Rumsfeld strategy created such a controversy? To answer that question, we must examine the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and measure it against the criteria outlined above.
NSS Legality
In the past, the use of preemptive force was a matter between states. However, since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the possibility of non-state actors and "rogue states" obtaining, concealing, transporting, and using weapons of mass destruction is a reality the world community must face. The NSS acknowledged this and maintains " the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous." 59 The strategy's basic premise is that the threat is greater now than ever before, and inaction can make states even more vulnerable. The Bush administration maintains preemption has been used in the past, and it reserves the right to use it in the future.
The NSS underscores the importance of world partners and multilateral cooperation, the necessity to think through preemption's use carefully, and asserts preemptive force has a place and time that should not be used "as a pretext for aggression." Incentive-based diplomacy has a substantive appeal in that it is the least costly in terms of lives and dollars. In most any text you look at on the subject, "experts" are ready and willing to put forth grand visions of how to "engage" the North with an approach loaded with carrots and short on sticks. Not surprisingly, it is the most enthusiastically received option by most regional partners. 68 While such engagement strategies have been effective in the past, I would submit the approach must be balanced one. Incentives without punitive measures for noncompliance would leave the U.S. and its allies at the mercy of a regime that has a history of repeated blackmail, nuclear extortion, and deceptive negotiating tactics. 69 One need look no further than the broken 1994 Agreed Framework. With no punitive measures, the DPRK had little incentive to comply; its regime remained intact (number one objective), it secured aid, and it continued developing a nuclear weapons stockpile; the proverbial "having your cake and eating it too." Given a shaky past negotiating history and deeply rooted suspicions, the U.S. remains intensely distrustful of North Korea. It will likely be extremely reluctant to offer the carrot without a stick or two. 70 The option of coercive diplomacy backed by military and/or non-military measures such as sanctions is a possibility, and is essentially the current negotiating policy of the U.S., though it draws much criticism from the other Six-Party partners. 71 While such an approach appears reasonable on the surface, without incentives to show some sort of gain, North Korea is unlikely to yield. Mistrust has forced both sides into a "give and take" negotiating style which provides incentives at a rate commensurate with DPRK capitulations. Along the way, the Kim regime has shown a remarkable ability to survive a wealth of manmade and natural disasters. Additionally, the DPRK regime leadership has shown a willingness to horde humanitarian relief to ensure its own survival and the survival of an immense conventional army, while the civilian population suffers. 72 For such reasons, punitive sanctions are most likely to affect only the civilian masses, much the same way well-intended sanctions against Iraq maligned the civilian population of that country.
With a significant portion of U.S. forces tied up in Iraq, as well as in a protracted war on terrorism, North Korea is unlikely to believe the U.S. can currently afford a conventional military strike to back up its threats . In the next year or years to come this might change, but for now the threat of military action without the means to back it up would be a hollow threat indeed. If the DPRK chooses to call a bluff, the consequences for U.S. policy in terms of credibility and precedent could be disastrous if a convincing response is not forthcoming. This opens the door to others attempting to emulate North Korean strategy. Of course any response, military or nonmilitary, risks provoking North Korea into a full blown conventional war or worse yet, a nuclear exchange. North Korea has maintained its willingness to use nuclear weapons to turn "Seoul into a sea of fire" should the U.S. initiate actions against them. 73 Such threats should be considered within the realm of possibilities if this option or a form of it is pursued.
Full military preemptive action is just as dangerous. While it sends the desired clear message, it pushes the limit on the price the U.S. might be willing to pay to achieve the desired end state. It also pushes the limit South Korea might be willing to pay, for it would surely receive the worst of the initial exchange. Virtually every expert on the subject agrees the United 
Strategic Intentions
Perhaps more than any other subject, North Korean strategic intentions and the corresponding desire for nuclear weapons remain a hotly debated topic. Opinions range the full spectrum. However, virtually every scholar on the subject has come to one shared conclusion:
the number one vital interest that drives the DPRK is regime survival. 81 A recent study of Korean experts by Andrew Scobell of the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute found that scholars generally place North Korean intentions into one of three distinct categories:
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• Modest/Security --aims are survival of the regime and a defensive mentality; economic recovery is important; desires to peacefully coexist with the South • Ambitious/Benevolent --regime survival still paramount but reform and economic opening are a possibility; will probably not give up nuclear program; desires a peaceful confederation with the South • Ambitious/Malevolent -aggressive and narcissistic; regime survival at all costs; nuclear weapons permits wide range of options, namely parasitic extortion to force concessions; desires unification of Korean Peninsula under communist rule, by force if necessary Scobell concludes that insufficient data exists to say with any degree of certainty, but suggests Pyongyang's strategy most likely falls somewhere between the latter two options. 83 Another way to view the DPRK's need for nuclear weapons is through demonstrated past actions. Orcutt defines four possible strategic intentions with a simple to remember phrase: blackmail, black-market, deter, detonate. 84 He concludes the DPRK will continue to use nuclear weapons to blackmail the U.S. and its regional partners into providing long sought security should not be bluffing, and the receiving party should understand that it is not. When properly used, red lines can be an effective deterrent to an adversary and provide a wide range of options. However, an adversary's reaction is never guaranteed, and there is always a possibility the threat will be misconstrued or blatantly disregarded. Credibility is crucial.
In 1993, the red line set by the Clinton administration was North Korea defueling their frozen nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. As long as the reactor remained inactive and verifiably sealed with its nuclear fuel in place, the U.S. would persist with diplomatic efforts. If the DPRK began removing spent fuel from the reactor, thus gaining access to more plutonium, it would cross a red line triggering a multitude of response options to include a U.S. military strike. 85 The DPRK did in fact cross that red line, and the U.S. reaction included terminating negotiations and referring North Korea to the UN for sanctions. 86 Analysis: Blackmail in itself does not meet the criteria laid out for permissive anticipatory self-defense. While it is a despicable and underhanded negotiating technique, there is no imminent threat, and no necessity that warrants a preemptive military response. This does not prohibit the administration from setting red lines for blackmail, and indeed both the Clinton and Bush administrations have done so, but nothing in blackmail would suggest preemption is an acceptable U.S. response.
Black-market:
Nuclear proliferation is at the very heart of the U.S. National Security Strategy. As stated in the NSS, "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning." 87 It is hard to conceive of a threat greater, or harder to defend against, than that of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of individuals who know no borders and follow no rules. The North Korean economy is in shambles. To make ends meet, the DPRK has resorted to illicit activities such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking, as well as selling ballistic missiles. 88 The price brought by one nuclear weapon from terrorists willing to pay virtually anything to get it, might pose a temptation too great for the DPRK to pass up.
Analysis:
The threat posed by a terrorist with a nuclear weapon most certainly meets the criteria for preemptive action. In the hands of someone willing to use them, the threat is indeed extreme, imminent, and of such proportion that nothing short of swift and deadly action would most likely stop it. The option is to wait until the weapon is detonated on U.S. soil, and that would simply be unacceptable-for the U.S. or for any state. I would propose two potential targets in a black-market scheme meet the preemptive criteria in accordance with international law: a terrorist with a nuclear weapon, and the state that provided it to them. If setting red lines for preemptive military action, it should be made unequivocally clear to North Korea that the confirmed sale or transfer of any nuclear technology to any terrorist, or terrorist group, will result in swift and decisive military action.
Deter: North Korea has repeatedly made claims in official news releases and in traditional
New Years Editorials, that it possesses nuclear weapons to deter what it feels is an aggressive United States. 89 After President Bush referred to North Korea by name as one of the three states forming the "axis of evil," and subsequently invaded Iraq in April 2002, Kim Jong Il disappeared from public view for more than six weeks. 90 Given past history, the consistent rhetoric coming from official DPRK sources, and deeply embedded mistrust between the two countries, it is not unreasonable to assume North Korea truly sees the military might of America as a genuine threat. Wound within the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is the somewhat "irrational" rationality inherent in North Korean actions. While it is easiest to explain North Korea's behavior as having no logic, Scobell points out this could not be farther from the truth.
Experts he reviewed on the subject all shared the same conclusion: Kim Jong Il and the North's leadership are rational actors who use unpredictable behavior as a form of deterrence designed to keep an adversary off balance. 91 The unpredictability of actions combined with nuclear weapons forms a level of uncertainty which is every bit as much a deterrent as the weapons alone.
Analysis: Possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, if that is indeed the true objective of the DPRK regime, does not meet international criteria for preemptive action. The professed North Korean rationale for development of nuclear weapons is defensive in nature with the aim of protecting the state and ensuring regime survival. Deterrence, designed to convince an adversary not to pursue an action yet to be taken based on showing him that taking such action would not be in his best interests, is essentially a peaceful attempt to solve a problem. 92 If the intent is peaceful, then in accordance with international law there exists no threat satisfactory to warrant preemption.
Detonate: The actual use of nuclear weapons for forceful reunification of the peninsula, as a force multiplier, or as a last ditch effort to ensure regime survival are all possible detonation scenarios involving nuclear weapons. Actual use of a weapon against the United States, or any of its allies or regional partners, would certainly result in a severe response; however, it would be just that, a response. The action would not be preemptive, it would be retaliatory. The better time to deal with nuclear threats is when they first emerge, adhering to a selective policy of prevention. This allows for a wider range of red lines and opens the door for a more selective use of military force should that become necessary. The rationale for prevention is fourfold.
First, the facilities required to process both uranium and plutonium are more readily identifiable. Enriching uranium requires a dedicated facility that gives off signature trace elements, and plutonium can only be created through irradiating uranium in a reactor. Targeting and surgically striking such facilities is easier and more likely to take them off line, hindering or precluding further efforts. Once nuclear weapons are developed, they are too easily dispersed and concealed making the certainty of destruction through military strikes virtually impossible.
Second, since prevention deals with capabilities before they become threats, the possibility of nuclear escalation is removed. In addition, if strikes are carried out at an early point, the enrichment and/or nuclear facilities never have the chance to become operational.
This would minimize collateral damage as well as reduce the amount of radiation released into the environment. If the strikes are delayed until enrichment facilities are operational, or once nuclear fuel has been irradiated in a reactor, the amount of radiation released following an attack is significantly higher.
Third and perhaps most importantly, if attacks are conducted before weapons grade material is produced, the opportunity to proliferate nuclear equipment and/or material is removed. This eliminates a significant threat to national security by keeping such weapons out of the hands of the non-state actors and terrorists that seek them.
Lastly, based on the above reasons, preventive self-defense might be an easier case to sell to the international community. The cost in both lives and dollars is less, proliferation is purged, and while the chance of conventional escalation exists, any possibility of nuclear escalation is eliminated. Contrasted with preemption, prevention is a better policy if diplomacy fails and military force becomes necessary.
Regardless of whether a state resorts to preemptive or preventive military force, and this author argues the latter, several steps should be taken before such action can be viewed as legal in the eyes of the international community. The first step would require an internationally accepted policy for dealing with states seeking to develop a nuclear weapons program. That policy should explicitly define the legal precedent for the use of force. I would submit the definition must be tied to the concept of imminent threat as currently defined in international law, but expanded sufficiently to address the unique threats posed by non-state actors and terrorists.
Such a definition would help address American fears that the current law inadequately addresses those concerns.
Next, since international law derives its precedence through one of two ways, treaties or custom, one or both of these methods is the proper vehicle for change. Amending the UN charter is the most logical means to change international law through treaty. The UN is the one international body that speaks for the world and is the one entity with the internationally recognized authority to sanction force by one state upon another. A combined effort through the UN Security Council, the additional nuclear-capable states, and those states with nuclear capability but without weapons, would be an appropriate body to work the issues. By utilizing the UN, the legal guidelines and circumstances authorizing when force is appropriate could be explicitly specified. Once part of the UN charter, it would become international law. 96 Acceptance through customary practice would be much more difficult and rest on shakier ground. In essence, to become accepted international law, states would have to partake in preventive action without international objection. Over time, the lack of objection would imply consent by default. 97 Consent subsequently equals custom, and custom produces law;
however, this process would take place over a period of many years, making it subject to objection at any point. For that purpose alone, treaty amendment is a better vehicle to induce change.
Third and tied to an explicit definition for the legality of preemptive/preventive force would be the requirement to wield preemptive/preventive force multilaterally. Once defined, actions taken should rely on the international system, through the UN, to address and arbitrate all concerns. Unilateral action taken outside the UN mandate would subject the offending party to international condemnation and result in UN censure, sanctions, or other such measures.
A final step would require preemptive/preventive force be exercised only as a last resort.
The full weight of the international community would be applied using all the elements of national power short of military force, while maintaining the latter for credibility. If implemented properly, an adversary would be given every opportunity to comply, knowing full well armed force is available and legally sanctioned to back up demands.
Conclusion
Is the strategic concept of preemption within the NSS legal? Yes, if it is wielded within the criteria accepted by the international community, demonstrates necessity, and acts according to the standard of proportionality. Is it rational to extend preemption to non-state actors? Not only is it rational, but it is necessary. Terrorists and other non-state actors have made themselves a viable threat to the security of the United States and its allies. Not dealing with them would in my opinion be irrational and irresponsible.
The biggest question and one that raises considerable debate is, is it legal to strike even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of an enemy attack as put forth in the NSS? The answer would be it depends. What is the threat? Is the threat from a state such as North Korea or non-state actor such as Al-Qaeda? If a state actor, this author feels only two instances warrant a preemptive strike: conclusive evidence of a pending attack (conventional or nuclear)
such that no doubt remains, or proliferation of nuclear materials or weapons to a non-state actor or terrorist. Only those two instances pose a grave enough threat.
If a non-state actor, the circumstances change. If doubt remains as to time and place of attack, but conclusive evidence exists that a non-state actor possesses WMD, then the threat could be considered imminent and anticipatory self-defense permissible, in accordance with international law. Of course, obtaining conclusive evidence and subsequently locating the threat would be a challenge in itself. In any case, preemption when dealing with nuclear weapons is a tricky business.
Following through with a policy of preemptive action against North Korea, a state already in possession of nuclear weapons, is a very thin line to walk-in many ways. Legally, making the case that a threat is indeed "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation" is extremely difficult. Of the situations we looked at, this author feels only one "red line" (short of an actual pending attack) is sufficient to necessitate preemptive military action against the DPRK--proliferation of nuclear components and/or processed nuclear materials to a terrorist organization or other non-state actor. Only the "black-market" scenario meets the legal standards for preemption. Possession, nuclear testing, and blackmail fail to meet the international law criterion to legally permit anticipatory military action.
In the case of North Korea, the U.S. must weigh several critical questions prior to any strike. Will the DPRK respond with conventional forces, nuclear weapons, or both? If they respond with nuclear weapons, can the weapons be defeated before striking their intended targets? Whether a conventional or nuclear response, is the U.S. willing to risk "one million/one trillion" to get the job done? Is South Korea willing to risk the same? Certainly any road taken by the U.S. to Pyongyang will have to go through Seoul first. The ROK stands to lose the most as it faces down hundreds of artillery pieces and hundreds of thousands of troops within short range of the capital. 98 Massive casualties, devastation to Seoul and other major population centers, and crippling economic effects all point to the conclusion the South would be extremely reluctant to support any military action in all but the most dire case.
In the years ahead, the United States must take a proactive role with the United Nations and willing partners. Efforts to develop a legal global strategy, including preventive action as one of many strategic options, should be a priority for the international community. Additionally, the U.S. must further refine and articulate its policy within the NSS if it is to conform to existing or future international law. Only then will states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons understand the global populace will not tolerate their actions. Waiting until the threat has matured is too late. In short, it all comes back to Deputy Secretary Armitage's question: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" Endnotes commonly-used DPRK negotiating tactics. In his paper, Dr. Yong-Sup Han outlines three of the most commonly relied upon tactics by DPRK negotiators. First, North Korea treats negotiations differently when dealing with the U.S. versus other key parties, often feigning a contrived internal struggle between hard line military leaders and "concerned" diplomats. Such tactics are typically designed to reduce U.S. pressure for results by intimating that the DPRK diplomat will be removed and replaced by a more hard line military negotiator. Second, it is not uncommon for the North to create a "crisis" designed to bring the parties to the table. The contrived crisis stays just under the level requiring substantive response, but is generally enough to force parties to address the issue at the bargaining table. Lastly, once at the table, it is typical for North Korea to attempt to expand the negotiations by dividing issues into minute subdivisions in an effort to squeeze every bit of concession it can.
